Showing posts with label TRAI. Show all posts
Showing posts with label TRAI. Show all posts

TRAI Consumers Protection Amendment for permitting the Special Data Vouchers with longer validity of 365 days

 The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) has today released The Telecom Consumers Protection (Tenth Amendment) Regulations, 2016 for permitting the Special Data Vouchers with longer validity of 365 days. 2. The present regulatory regime governed by TCPR-2012 allows Telecom Service Providers to offer data services in the form of Special Tariff Voucher (STV) either exclusively or in combination with other tariff items with a maximum permitted validity of 90 days. Requests were received in TRAI seeking longer validity for data-packs (i.e. Special Tariff Vouchers with only data benefits) primarily to address the concern of marginal consumers of wireless Internet who prefer lower denomination data packs with longer validity. 3. After undertaking a consultation process TRAI has notified the 10th Amendment to the TCPR permitting the maximum validity of 365 days for data only STVs instead of prevailing maximum validity of 90 days. 4. The "Telecom Consumers Protection (Tenth Amendment) Regulations, 2016" is available on TRAI website http://www. trai.gov.in. For any further clarifications please contact Smt Vinod Kotwal, Advisor (Financial and Economic Analysis Division), TRAIon 011-23230752.

TRAI favours of Net neutrality No service provider can offer or charge discriminatory tariffs for data services on the basis of content.

The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India on Monday issued the 'Prohibition of Discriminatory Tariffs for Data Services Regulations, 2016' that bars service providers from offerring or charging discriminatory tariffs for data services on the basis of content.
1No service provider can offer or charge discriminatory tariffs for data services on the basis of content.
2No service provider shall enter into any arrangement, agreement or contract, by whatever name called, with any person, natural or legal, that the effect of discriminatory tariffs for data services being offered or charged by the service provider for the purpose of evading the prohibition in this regulation.
3Reduced tariff for accessing or providing emergency services, or at times of public emergency has been permitted.
4Financial disincentives for contravention of the regulation have also been specified
5TRAI may review these regulations after a period of two years.
A service provider may reduce tariff for accessing or providing emergency services, the body ruled. TRAI may review these regulations after a period of two years.
TRAI will also levy a penalty of Rs. 50,000 a day for discriminatory tariffs charged by service providers.
This comes amid an ongoing debate over net neutrality in the country.
Earlier, the regulatory body had issued two consulation papers - one in December 2016 aboutdifferential data pricing and the one in early 2015 about over-the-top (OTT) services.
The consultation paper on differential data pricing had raised concern over zero-rating tariff models — a practice wherein service providers offer free data to users for select applications and websites — and the paper had become key to the debate on Net neutrality.
According to Internet activists, this model violates the principle of Net neutrality as it restricts access to free, open Internet. Facebook’s Free Basic initiative has come under severe criticism in India as it is based on a zero-rating model. TRAI has also asked Reliance Communication, Facebook’s partner in India for Free Basics, to put the service on hold till the authority considers all the details and terms and conditions of the service.

Save the internet. Tell TRAI we need network neutrality.


Save the internet. Tell TRAI we need network neutrality.

This page was created as a collection of the best arguments that may be made in favour of net neutrality, in the framework of the TRAI consultation paper.
The purpose is to assist supporters of strong net neutrality in articulating their own views on the matter in a legally precise manner, in order to submit a response to the TRAI (atadvqos@trai.gov.in) before the deadline on 24 April 2015.


send the following response for netneutrality.in

To the Chairman, TRAI

Thank you for giving me this opportunity to share my views on the consultation paper published by TRAI on March 27, 2015 titled "Regulatory Framework For Over-the-Top (OTT) Services”. I am worried that this consultation paper makes sweeping assumptions about the Internet, and does not take a neutral and balanced view of the subject of Internet Licensing and Net Neutrality. Any public consultation must be approached in a neutral manner by the regulator, so that people can form an informed opinion.

I strongly support an open internet, for which I believe it is critical to uphold net neutrality and reject any moves towards licensing of Internet applications and Web services.

I urge TRAI to commit to outlining measures to protect and advance net neutrality for all Indians. Net neutrality requires that the Internet be maintained as an open platform, on which network providers treat all content, applications and services equally, without discrimination. The TRAI must give importance to safeguarding the interests of our country’s citizens and the national objective of Digital India and Make In India, over claims made by some corporate interests.

I request that my response be published on the TRAI website alongside other comments filed, in line with past practice regarding public consultations. I urge that TRAI issue a specific response to user submissions after examining the concerns raised by them, and hold open house discussions across India, accessible to users and startups before making any recommendations.



Question 1: Is it too early to establish a regulatory framework for Internet/OTT services, since internet penetration is still evolving, access speeds are generally low and there is limited coverage of high-speed broadband in the country? Or, should some beginning be made now with a regulatory framework that could be adapted to changes in the future? Please comment with justifications.

No new regulatory framework in the telecom sector is required for Internet services and apps - and no such regulation should come into effect in future either.

This question incorrectly presumes that regulation of the Internet is absent and there is a need to create it. Additionally, the technical language of “Over-the-Top” applications used in the consultation paper fails to convey that it is truly referring to the online services and applications which make today’s Internet which we all use; Facebook, Ola, Zomato, Paytm, WhatsApp, Zoho and Skype etc. The Internet is already subject to existing law in India - any extra regulatory or licensing regime will only be detrimental to the customer and to Indian firms developing online services and apps.

Under the current regulatory framework, users can access the internet-based services and apps either for a low fee or for free where the application owners make money by selling advertisements based on user data. With additional regulations and licenses, it will make it expensive for these services to reach out to their customers eventually leading to higher prices and undesirable levels of advertising - which is against the public interest and counterproductive.

It appears that the telecom companies are shifting goalposts. Many telecom companies have earlier argued in the consultation paper floated by TRAI on mobile value added services (MVAS) that it was not necessary to regulate these value added services. They said MVAS are already governed by general laws under the Indian legal system and comply with the security interests as they operate on the networks of legitimate telecom license holders. Internet platforms also are regulated and governed by general laws in addition to specialised laws such as the Information Technology Act, and the same treatment should be extended to them as well.

As TRAI said previously in its recommendations after consulting on MVAS regulation:

“The Authority preferred least intrusive and minimal regulatory framework and thus no separate category of licence for value added services is envisaged. After second round of consultations, the Authority is also not favoring registration of Value Added Service Providers (VASPs) or content aggregators under the “Other Service Provider (OSP)” category.”

“Content shall be subject to relevant content regulation and compliance of prevailing copyrights including digital management rights and other laws on the subject (para 3.12.2). The content is subjected to content regulation/ guidelines of Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Information Technology Act, 2000, Cable Television Networks (Regulation) Act, 1995, Indian Copyright Act etc., as amended from time to time. The content regulation shall be as per law in force from time to time. There should be consistency in the treatment of content across all kinds of media including print, digital/multimedia to avoid any discrimination. (para 3.13.3):”

Imposing a licensing and regulation regime carry significant risks of destroying innovation. Launching new services and features will take more time and will make it difficult for new startups with low cash reserves to enter the market. It will basically ring the death knell for the country's fast-growing digital media sector.



Question 2: Should the Internet/OTT players offering communication services (voice, messaging and video call services through applications (resident either in the country or outside) be brought under the licensing regime? Please comment with justifications.

Firstly, there is no need for licensing of internet based communication service providers. To suggest such a move further points towards the TRAI consultation being tilted in favour of telecom operators.

Secondly, fundamentally both Internet-based communication services and non-communication services are the same. They sit on top of the network provided by telecom operators. And the spectrum that telecom operators utilise to offer this network on pipe is already licensed, hence there is no need for additional licensing.

This issue also needs to be looked at from another perspective. Many non-communication services on the Internet also offer real-time chat or video interaction features for the benefit of customers, which will be affected by bringing such services under a licensing regime.

The extent of innovation we have witnessed over the years has been greatly aided by the low cost of entry. Any form of regulation or licensing will increase the entry cost, thereby hindering innovation and equal opportunity to startups to establish themselves in the market. Behind every Zoho, WhatsApp and Skype there are numerous failures. Licensing will essentially increase the cost and likelihood of failure - and greatly discourage innovation.



Question 3: Is the growth of Internet/OTT impacting the traditional revenue stream of Telecom operators/Telecom operators? If so, is the increase in data revenues of the Telecom Operators sufficient to compensate for this impact? Please comment with reasons.

There is absolutely no evidence to suggest that VoIP services like Hike or Skype are cannibalising voice revenues of telecom operators. In fact, heads of more than one Indian telecom operator have clearly stated the same over the past few months. For example, Airtel India CEO Gopal Vittal had said during the company’s earnings conference call, earlier this year, that there’s no evidence of VoIP cannibalisation of voice services. Last year, Idea Cellular MD Himanshu Kapania had also said that OTT apps like Viber have had some impact on their International calling business, but on regular voice calls, there was no impact.

We also need to remember that data revenues also fall under the traditional revenue streams category as per the Unified Access License Agreement (http://www.dot.gov.in/access-services/introduction-unified-access-servicescellular-mobile-services). So, it is factually incorrect to say that increase in data revenues will affect traditional revenue streams.

A Morgan Stanley report on the Indian telecom industry from last year mentions that data revenues is likely to contribute about 23% of telecom operators’ overall revenues over the next two years. A study jointly done by AT Kearney and Google estimated that telecom companies will earn an additional $8 billion in revenues by 2017 due to the proliferation of data and data-based services.



Question 4: Should the Internet/OTT players pay for use of the Telecom Operators network over and above data charges paid by consumers? If yes, what pricing options can be adopted? Could such options include prices based on bandwidth consumption? Can prices be used as a means of product/service differentiation? Please comment with justifications.

Internet-based services and apps don’t pay for telecom operators for using the network, and it should remain the same going forward. Forcing Internet-based services to pay extra for using a particular network negatively impact consumers and harm the Indian digital ecosystem. As mentioned in the above answer, data revenues of Indian telecom operators is already on an upswing and is slated to increase rapidly over the next few years, hence the argument for creating a new revenue source is not justified.

Charging users extra for specific apps or services will overburden them, which in turn will lead to them not using the services at all. It is also akin to breaking up the Internet into pieces, which is fundamentally against what Net Neutrality stands for. Also, the Internet depends on interconnectivity and the users being able to have seamless experience - differential pricing will destroy the very basic tenets of the Internet.



Question 5: Do you agree that imbalances exist in the regulatory environment in the operation of Internet/OTT players? If so, what should be the framework to address these issues? How can the prevailing laws and regulations be applied to Internet/OTT players (who operate in the virtual world) and compliance enforced? What could be the impact on the economy? Please comment with justifications.

There is no regulatory imbalance in the environment in which the internet services and applications operate. In fact, the word “regulatory imbalance” is incorrect here. Telecom operators holds licenses to spectrum which is a public resource. Internet services and applications don’t have to acquire licenses. Moreover, there is a clear distinction between services provided by telecom operators and internet platforms—so no additional regulation is required.

Also, internet services and applications are already well-covered under the Information Technology Act, 2000 and Indian Penal Code, 1860. More importantly, internet services are intermediaries that allow a communication system for their users—and intermediaries cannot be held responsible for the acts of their users as per Section 79 of the IT Act, 2000. Our Supreme Court has recently ruled on this area in the Shreya Singhal versus Union of India case, holding that Internet content is protected by our Constitution’s right to free expression and setting out the acceptable limits for government regulation.



Question 6: How should the security concerns be addressed with regard to OTT players providing communication services? What security conditions such as maintaining data records, logs etc. need to be mandated for such OTT players? And, how can compliance with these conditions be ensured if the applications of such OTT players reside outside the country? Please comment with justifications.

The internet services and apps are well-covered under the existing laws and regulations. These include the Code of Criminal Procedure, Indian Telegraph Act, Indian Telegraph Rules, and the Information Technology Act and its different rules pertaining to intermediaries and interception. These different regulations allow the Indian government and law enforcement agencies to access the data stored by internet platforms when deemed legally necessary. Any additional regulations carry grave risk of breaching user privacy and would also require constitutional review - especially since the Government is still working on a proposed Privacy Bill.

The government and courts also have the power to block access to websites on the grounds of national security and public order. It has taken similar steps in the past and has been widely reported by the media. The transparency reports periodically published by major internet companies suggests Indian government routinely requests for user data and blocking of user accounts. Between July 2014 and December 2014, Indian authorities had 5,473 requests for data, covering 7,281 user accounts from Facebook and the company had a compliance rate of 44.69%. Google had a compliance rate of 61% with respect to the requests made by different government agencies across India.



Question 7: How should the OTT players offering app services ensure security, safety and privacy of the consumer? How should they ensure protection of consumer interest? Please comment with justifications.

Although user privacy and security is of paramount importance, additional regulation carries the inherent risk of breaching user privacy which is not in the consumer’s interest. The Information Technology Act, 2000 already addresses the security concerns of the user. But more importantly, any criminal act committed using these platforms can be tried under the Indian Penal Code. So, there is no need to burden the internet platforms with additional regulations.

Also, it is worth noting that many telecom companies in India have not made information publicly available as to whether and how they comply with regulations that guarantee security, privacy and safety of the customer. TRAI’s current paper fails to articulate why the internet services and apps should be brought under similar regulations.



Question 8:

In what manner can the proposals for a regulatory framework for OTTs in India draw from those of ETNO, referred to in para 4.23 or the best practices summarised in para 4.29? And, what practices should be proscribed by regulatory fiat? Please comment with justifications.

ETNO is similar to India’s COAI which makes it an industry lobby group. Understandably, the suggestions made by ETNO heavily favor the telecom companies and will be detrimental to customers if India refers to their suggestions.

ETNO’s stand have been widely criticized in the past. Europe’s own group of government regulators [Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communication (BEREC)]

http://berec.europa.eu/files/document_register_store/2012/11/BoR_%2812%29_120_BEREC_on_ITR.pdf ETNO’s proposals could jeopardize the “continued development of the open, dynamic and global platform that the Internet provides” which will “lead to an overall loss of welfare”. Additionally, the international free expression group Article 19 says ETNO’s proposal “would seriously undermine net neutrality.

According to Access Now, ETNO’s recommendations would have meant higher data charges for customers while from an entrepreneur’s standpoint, it will limit their ability to reach out to a wider market. For a small but fast growing startup and digital media sector in India, this can potentially ring the death knell. ETNO’s suggestions on this subject so far have failed to have been accepted by any government agency - including the regulators in their own host countries. It is therefore especially troubling that TRAI is choosing to make one of their proposals a pillar of this public consultation here in India.



Question 9: What are your views on net-neutrality in the Indian context? How should the various principles discussed in para 5.47 be dealt with? Please comment with justifications.

Net Neutrality, by definition, means no discrimination of traffic flowing on the internet with respect to speed, access and price. Chile and Brazil, which are developing countries just like India, have passed laws supporting net neutrality. This is in addition to government commitments to implement net neutrality legislation in the United States and European Union.

India has 1 billion people without internet access and it is imperative for our democracy to have an open and free internet where users are free to choose the services they want to access—instead of a telecom operator deciding what information they can access.

Internet apps and services are expected to contribute 5% to India’s GDP by 2020. That will only happen of entrepreneurs, big and small, have a level playing field that encourages innovation and non-preferential treatment—something that net neutrality ensures.

Assuming there is no net neutrality, only the big players will be able to strike deals with telcos while the smaller players remain inaccessible, which will go against the principles of net neutrality as listed below:

No blocking by TSPs and ISPs on specific forms of internet traffic, services and applications.

No slowing or “throttling” internet speeds by TSPs and ISPs on specific forms of internet traffic, services and applications.

No preferential treatment of services and platforms by TSPs and ISPs.

It is also worth noting that the proposed framework will give too much power in the hands of the telecom companies, which is not healthy for the ecosystem.



Question 10: What forms of discrimination or traffic management practices are reasonable and consistent with a pragmatic approach? What should or can be permitted? Please comment with justifications.

This question assumes that traffic discrimination is necessary and is a norm. Rather, traffic discrimination should be an exception as it is against the principles of net neutrality.

In such exceptional cases, telecom companies need to have the permission of TRAI or other competent government agency through public hearing to carry out “traffic management” to ensure transparency in the entire process. Further, it should be kept in mind that such steps shouldn’t interfere with the access, affordability and quality of the services.

More importantly, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/sites/digital-agenda/files/Traffic%20Management%20Investigation%20BEREC_2.pdf jointly by BEREC and the European Commission suggest that the propensity of the telecom operators to restrict access of internet services is high. The report noted that telecom operators were most inclined to block and throttle P2P services on mobile as well as fixed line networks. VoIP, on the other hand, was blocked mostly on telecom networks.

Keeping this in mind, TRAI needs to ensure that instances of discrimination of traffic should be few, far between and, above all, transparent.



Question 11: Should the TSPs be mandated to publish various traffic management techniques used for different OTT applications? Is this a sufficient condition to ensure transparency and a fair regulatory regime?

The question is based on the premise that publishing various traffic management techniques for Internet services will ensure a fair regulatory regime and therefore such discrimination is permissible. We have repeatedly said in the above answers that discrimination of services will not bring about a fair regime for users.

Further, a recent study [http://bit.ly/1D7QEp9] in the UK has pointed out that merely publishing data on traffic management will not translate into a fair regime. The study found that most consumers did not understand traffic management or use it as a basis for switching operators. Those who did do so comprised a group perceived to be small or insignificant enough that most network operators did not seek to factor them into their product decisions, despite some consumers’ complaints about traffic management. In India where awareness and activism on issues of net neutrality is considerably less, it is unlikely to play the critical role that the Consultation Paper suggests.



Question 12: How should a conducive and balanced environment be created such that TSPs are able to invest in network infrastructure and CAPs are able to innovate and grow? Who should bear the network upgradation costs? Please comment with justifications

The question assumes that a “balanced” environment would lead to increased investment and upgradation of networks.. However, if revenue is generated by charging CAPs to reach customers rather than only charging users for data, the incentives for a TSP can potentially change. Telecom operators now gain the incentive to maintain a level scarcity and not upgrade existing infrastructure in order to maximize gatekeeper revenue. There is no evidence to support that access fees charged to CAPs will spark network upgradation and may have the opposite effect itself.

We’ve mentioned before that telecom operators should be acting as data pipes which can provide users access to Internet and that they stand to substantially gain from upgrading networks. Telecom operators stand to gain substantially by upgrading existing networks by proliferating the use of data by users, and it therefore stands to reason that the costs of upgradation should be borne by them. The above answers also point out that the heads of the leading telecom operators in the country have not seen evidence of cannibalization of existing services and that data usage has only been steadily increasing.



Question 13: Should TSPs be allowed to implement non-price based discrimination of services? If so, under what circumstances are such practices acceptable? What restrictions, if any, need to be placed so that such measures are not abused? What measures should be adopted to ensure transparency to consumers? Please comment with justifications.

Discrimination of services in any form is detrimental for the growth of the telecom industry itself and there should be no circumstance for a telecom operator to do so. Given the diverse nature of the Internet, telecom operators should not be allowed to determine what type of service should get more priority. For example, a consumer in India probably relies on VoIP calls to keep in touch with people abroad and if there is throttling of these services, it infringes on the user’s fundamental right of freedom of expression. An Internet service that a telecom operator thinks which could lead to traffic congestion, might be vital to consumers. Further, a telecom operator might use throttling to further a service promoted by them and induce consumers into using them, thereby eliminating choice.

Transparency alone will not bring about a fair regime for users, and it is crucial that TSPs be prohibited from discriminating between services



Question 14: Is there a justification for allowing differential pricing for data access and OTT communication services? If so, what changes need to be brought about in the present tariff and regulatory framework for telecommunication services in the country? Please comment with justifications.

The question above is simply a rephrasing Question 13. Differential pricing for data access and OTT communication services again simply amounts to discrimination of data services. Hence there is no justification for differential pricing other than furthering corporate profit. Telecom operators stand to gain substantially from the proliferation of all data services including communication services. A neutral internet allows smaller companies to innovate and compete with larger players and ensure that there is a free market. Any changes in the present tariff and regulatory framework is not needed save for ensuring that the interests of the consumer is taken care of.



Question 15: Should OTT communication service players be treated as Bulk User of Telecom Services (BuTS)? How should the framework be structured to prevent any discrimination and protect stakeholder interest? Please comment with justification.

Treating OTT communication service players as Bulk User of Telecom Services again amounts to discrimination of data services and hence it should not be allowed. The question also further assumes that the stakeholders are only the telecom operators and not the consumers. If only the interests of the telecom operators are protected by treating services which compete with their traditional services differently rather than innovating themselves, it would lead to a situation of anti-competitiveness. Telecom companies have an interest in imposing their control over information and communication networks, but the price of that would mean stifling competition, increased barriers for innovation and business and eventually infringe on the fundamental rights of Indian citizens.



Question 16: What framework should be adopted to encourage India-specific OTT apps? Please comment with justifications.

A recent Deloitte report titled Technology, Media and Telecommunications India Predictions 2015 predicted that paid apps will generate over Rs 1500 crore revenues in 2015 (http://bit.ly/1alhH5S). Increased acceptance of paid apps can only be possible if there’s Network Neutrality. In fact, Deepinder Goyal, the founder and CEO of the highly successful app Zomato recently commented "Couldn’t have built Zomato if we had a competitor on something like Airtel Zero"

The moment an app developer/company is forced to tie-up with a telecom operator to ensure that users opt for it, an artificial prohibitive barrier will be created. All app developers and the companies behind them need to be provided an even playing field.

We also need more reports on the Indian app economy, to understand, firstly, how the adoption and usage of apps is changing and, secondly, to comprehend its impact on the Indian economy.



Question 17: If the OTT communication service players are to be licensed, should they be categorised as ASP or CSP? If so, what should be the framework? Please comment with justifications.

The question of categorising doesn’t even arise, because as mentioned earlier any extra regulations or licensing is going to be detrimental to the end user. Requiring licensing of online services and mobile apps under the current telecom framework in India will have enormous negative consequences. The impossibly onerous burdens imposed by such licensing would results in many such globally developed services and apps not being launched in India - and our own startup efforts to develop local versions of such apps being killed in their early stages. The net results would be decreased consumer benefit and a massive slowdown in innovation and reduced “Make in India” efforts due to the regulatory cost of doing business becoming very high.



Question 18: Is there a need to regulate subscription charges for OTT communication services? Please comment with justifications.

Subscription charges for such apps need to be allowed to evolve as it would in a pure market economy. The subscribers (buyers) would want to pay the lowest possible price, and the app developers/companies (sellers) would want to charge as much as possible, eventually leading to a fair price.

Subscription charges for such Internet-based services have remained, more or less, quite low in India, especially because the cost of switching from one service provider to another is also quite low: This competition will ensure that charges remain fair, without the need to regulate them, going forward as well. As noted in response to earlier questions, existing Indian law also applies to online services - which would include the Consumer Protection Act and other regulations meant to prevent cheating or other illegal pricing issues.



Question 19: What steps should be taken by the Government for regulation of non-communication OTT players? Please comment with justifications.

As mentioned earlier, irrespective of what an OTT app is used for (communication, online shopping, etc) they’re all essentially Internet-based services, and hence there is no question of creating new regulatory measures.



Question 20: Are there any other issues that have a bearing on the subject discussed?

In the interim, TRAI should issue an order or regulation preventing network neutrality violations by telecom service providers. Some telecom companies have shown scant respect for the issues presently under consideration and despite its questionable legality have rolled out various services which violate network neutrality. Any delay in forming regulations or preventing them in the interim till the process is complete is only likely to consolidate their status. This is not only an affront to the Internet users in India but also to the regulatory powers of the TRAI.

If the question of regulating subscription charges arises because of the fear of OTT communication services/VoIP cannibalising Voice services by telcos, then it needs to be pointed out that more than one telecom operator in India has already come out and said that there’s no evidence to support such a fear.

Earlier this year, Airtel India CEO Gopal Vittal had clearly said during the company’s earnings conference call that there’s no evidence of VoIP cannibalisation of voice services (http://bit.ly/1DzZQ77 - pdf). Last year, Idea Cellular MD Himanshu Kapania had also said that OTT apps like Viber have had some impact on their International calling business, but on regular voice calls, there was no impact (http://www.medianama.com/2014/07/223-idea-cellular-viber/).
http://www.savetheinternet.in/

THE TELECOM COMMERCIAL COMMUNICATIONS CUSTOMER PREFERENCE (FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT) REGULATIONS, 2013

Page 1 of 9

TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE GAZETTE OF INDIA, EXTRAORDINARY,
PART III, SECTION 4
TELECOM REGULATORY AUTHORITY OF INDIA
NOTIFICATION
New Delhi, the 03rd December, 2013
No.311-28/2013-QoS- In exercise of powers conferred by section 36, read with
sub-clause(v) of clause (b) and clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 11, of the
Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997 (24 of 1997), the Telecom
Regulatory Authority of India hereby makes the following regulations to further
amend the Telecom Commercial Communications Customer Preference
Regulations, 2010 (6 of 2010), namely:-
THE TELECOM COMMERCIAL COMMUNICATIONS CUSTOMER
PREFERENCE (FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT) REGULATIONS, 2013
(15 OF 2013)
1. (1) These regulations may be called the Telecom Commercial
Communications Customer Preference (Fourteenth Amendment)
Regulations, 2013.
(2) (a) Except as otherwise provided in clause (b),these regulations shall
come into force from the date of their publication in the official
Gazette.
(b) Regulation 4, regulation 5 and regulation 6 of these regulations
shall come into force afterthirty days from the date of their
publicationin the official Gazette. Page 2 of 9

2. In regulation 14 of the Telecom Commercial Communications Customer
Preference Regulations, 2010 (hereinafter referred to as the principal
regulations),

(a) in sub-regulation (3), for the word “three” the word “five” shall be
substituted;

(b) after sub-regulation (3), the following sub-regulation shall be inserted
namely : -
 “(4) A telemarketer registered with the Authority may, sixty days before
to the expiry of its registration, submit an application to the Authority,
along with the specified fee, for renewal of its registration on the same
terms and conditions.”

3. In regulation 20 of the principal regulations, in sub-regulation 2,---

(a) in clause (a), the following proviso shall be inserted namely : -
“Provided that, the Authority may, from time to time, amend the
provisions of the agreement specified in Schedule-IV and every
agreement entered into between the access provider and telemarketer
shall be modified accordingly, within fifteen days of such amendment”;

(b) in clause (b), the following proviso shall be inserted namely : -
“Provided that, the Authority may, from time to time, amend the
provisions of the agreement specified in Schedule-V and every
agreement entered into between the access provider and transactional
message sending entity shall be modified accordingly, within fifteen days
of such amendment”;

4. In Schedule-III to the principal regulations,---
 Page 3 of 9

(a) for clause 6the following clause shall be substituted, namely:-
“6. All new telemarketers shall pay Rupees Five Thousand only (Rs.
5000/- ) as Registration fee. Existing telemarketers, renewing their
registration as per regulation 14, shall pay Rupees Five Thousand
only(Rs. 5000/- ) as fee for renewal of their registration”;

(b) for clause 7 the following clause shall be substituted, namely:-
“7. Telemarketers registered with the TERM Cell of Department of
Telecommunications shall apply afresh for new registration as per the
procedure in the Schedule.”

(c) in clause 8,after the words “registration fee” and before the word “by”, the
words “and customer education fee”, shall be deleted.

(d) for clause 9 the following clause shall be substituted, namely:-
“9.Full registration fee has to be deposited by the telemarketer and no
part payment shall be accepted.”

 (e) insub-clause (a) of clause 10, after the bracket andwords“(registration fee”
and before the bracket and word“) by”, the words “and customer
education fee”, shall be deleted.

(f) clause18 shall be deleted.
(g) clause19 shall be renumbered as clause 18.
(h) clause20 shall be renumbered as clause 19.
(i) clause 21 shall be renumbered as clause 20.
(j) clause22 shall be renumbered as clause 21.
(k) clause23 shall be renumbered as clause 22.
(l) clause24 shall be renumbered as clause 23.

5. In Schedule-IV to the principal regulations,---- Page 4 of 9


(a) in clause 9, for the words, letters, figures and brackets “rupees one lakh
only (Rs. 1,00,000/-)”, the words, letters, figures and brackets “rupees fifty
thousand only (Rs. 50,000/-)” shall be substituted.

(b) for clause 11, the following clause shall be substituted, namely:-

“(11) The second party has agreed that on issue of first notice by theAccess
Provider to the second partyfor sending unsolicitedcommercial
communication to the subscriber whose telephone numberappears in the
National Customer Preference Register, the second partyshall deposit
additional security amount of rupees one lakh only (Rs.1,00,000/-). The
second party has also agreed that on issue of second notice by the
Access Provider to the telemarketer for sending similar unsolicited
commercial communication, the second party shall deposit additional
security amount of rupees one lakh fifty thousand only (Rs. 1,50,000/-)
and on issue of third notice by the Access Provider to thetelemarketer for
sending similar unsolicited commercial communication, the second
partyshall deposit an additional securityof amount of rupees four lakh
only (Rs. 4,00,000/-).”

6. In Schedule-V to the principal regulations,----
(a) in clause 8, for the words, letters, figures and brackets “rupees one lakh
only (Rs. 1,00,000/-)”, the words, letters, figures and brackets “rupees fifty
thousand only (Rs. 50,000/-)” shall be substituted.

(b) for clause 10, the following clause shall be substituted, namely:-

“(10) The second party has agreed that on issue of first notice by the
Access Provider to the second party for sending unsolicited commercial
communication to the subscriber whose telephone number appears in the Page 5 of 9

National Customer Preference Register, the second party shall deposit
additional security amount of rupees one lakh only (Rs. 1,00,000/-). The
second party has also agreed that on issue of second notice by the Access
Provider to the second party for sending similar unsolicited commercial
communication, the second party shall deposit additional security
amount of rupees one lakh fifty thousand only (Rs. 1,50,000/-) and on
issue of third notice by the Access Provider to the second party for
sending similar unsolicited commercial communication, the second party
shall deposit an additional security of amount of rupees four lakh only
(Rs. 4,00,000/-).”


(Rajeev Agrawal)
SECRETARY


Note1: The principal regulations were published in the Gazette of India,
Extraordinary, Part III, Section 4 vide notification No. 305-17/2010-QoS dated
1st December, 2010.
Note 2:The principal regulations were amended vide notification No. 305-
17/2010-QoSand published in the Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part III,
Section 4 dated 14th December, 2010.
Note 3: The principal regulations were further amended (second amendment)
vide notification No. 305-17/2010-QoS and published in the Gazette of India,
Extraordinary, Part III, Section 4 dated 28thDecember, 2010.
Note 4: The principal regulations were further amended (third amendment) vide
notification No. 305-17/2010-QoS and published in the Gazette of India,
Extraordinary, Part III, Section 4 dated 31stJanuary, 2011.
Note 5: The principal regulations were further amended (fourth amendment)
vide notification No. 305-17/2010-QoS and published in the Gazette of India,
Extraordinary, Part III, Section 4 dated 28th February, 2011.
Note 6: The principal regulations were further amended (fifth amendment) vide
notification No. 305-17/2010-QoS and published in the Gazette of India,
Extraordinary, Part III, Section 4 dated 18th March, 2011. Page 6 of 9

Note 7: The principal regulations were further amended (Sixth amendment)
vide notification No. 352-4/2011-CA (QoS) Pt. and published in the Gazette of
India, Extraordinary, Part III, Section 4 dated 05thSeptember, 2011.
Note 8: The principal regulations were further amended (Seventh amendment)
vide notification No. 352-4/2011-CA (QoS) and published in the Gazette of
India, Extraordinary, Part III, Section 4 dated 25thOctober, 2011.
Note 9: The principal regulations were further amended (Eighth amendment)
vide notification No. 352-4/2011-CA (QoS) and published in the Gazette of
India, Extraordinary, Part III, Section 4 dated 1st November, 2011.
Note 10: The principal regulations were further amended (Ninth amendment)
vide notification No. 305-24/2011-QoS(SP)and published in the Gazette of
India, Extraordinary, Part III, Section 4 dated 14th May, 2012.
Note11: The principal regulations were further amended (Tenth amendment)
vide notification No. 311-13/2012-QoS and published in the Gazette of India,
Extraordinary, Part III, Section 4 dated 5th November, 2012.
Note12: The principal regulations were further amended (Eleventh
Amendment) vide notification No. 311-23/2013-QoS and published in the
Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part III, Section 4 dated 24rd May, 2013.
Note13: The principal regulations were further amended (Twelfth amendment)
vide notification No. 311-23/2013-QoS and published in the Gazette of India,
Extraordinary, Part III, Section 4 dated 24rd May, 2013.
Note14: The principal regulations were further amended (Thirteenth
amendment) vide notification No. 311-27/2013-QoS and published in the
Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part III, Section 4 dated 22nd August, 2013.
Note 15: The Explanatory Memorandum explains the objects and reasons of
Telecom Commercial Communications Customer Preference (Fourteenth
Amendment) Regulations, 2013 (15 of 2013) . Page 7 of 9

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

1. Telecom customers are aggrieved with Unsolicited Commercial
Communications (UCCs) in the form of SMSs or voice calls to promote
commercial activity for quite a long time. In 2009-10, TRAI reviewed the
regulatory framework for controlling UCCs and, on 1st December 2010,
issued “The Telecom Commercial Communications Customer Preference
Regulations, 2010”. These regulationshave provision for mandatory
registration of telemarketers with TRAI after payment of a one-time fee of
Rs 10,000/-. These regulations also provided that before taking the
telecom resources from service provider, a telemarketer has to deposit
initially an amount Rs. 1,00,000/- with service provider as security
deposit.

2. The aforesaid provisions were made in the regulations with the aim that
if all telemarketers registered themselves with the Authority and the
consumers electing not to receive promotional commercial messages
register themselves in NCPR, the menace of UCCs would be controlled.
However, subsequent events proved otherwise. Though some did register
as telemarketers, many others chose to continue operating as
telemarketers without registering themselves as such. That is, most of
those sending UCCs, operated beyond the pale of TRAI’s regulations; they
obtained multiple SIMs as “normal subscribers” and made calls or sent
out messages (SMSs) in bulk as UCCs to other telecom subscribers.

3. The UCC menace persisted leading consumers to complain about the
number of UCCs being received. At various points of time, the Authority
has responded to consumers’ concerns by intervening through
Regulations and Directions to curb the problem. The significant
measures taken includes Stopping UCCs sent through international
routes, [Providing a ceiling on the number of SMSs per SIM per Page 8 of 9

day,]Economic deterrent to sending more than 100 SMSs per SIM per day,
Mandating signature verification of bulk SMSs, Enhancing consumer
awareness and obtaining an undertaking from subscribers against
sending commercial SMSs, Making it easy for consumers to file a
complaint, Disconnection and blacklisting of subscribers who do
telemarketing without registering themselves with TRAI etc.

4. While the Authority’s regulatory interventions have tempered the menace
of UCCs, it has not altogether abated. The problem is that UCCs (SMSs
or calls) from persons not registered as telemarketers continue to irritate
and harass normal subscribers. Such individuals deliberately
masquerade themselves as “normal subscribers” even though their
primary purpose for obtaining telecom resources is for telemarketing
activities.

5. The Authority has noticed with concern that a large number of
complaints received from consumers pertain to calls or messages
originated by or on behalf of banks, insurance companies, builders etc.
who are promoting their business by engaging unregistered
telemarketers in total disregard of the regulations made by the Authority.
These organisations, being the principal are equally responsible for the
non-compliance of the regulations and directions issued by the Authority
to address the problem of UCC. Hence, in order to make these entities
accountable, the Authority has decided to amend the regulations (13th
Amendment) to provide for disconnection of all telecom resources of such
organisations if they are found to be engaged in telemarketing through
unregistered telemarketers.

6. Authority has noticed that after implementation of The Telecom
Commercial Communications Customer Preference (Thirteenth Page 9 of 9

Amendment) Regulations, 2013 majority of complaints pertaining to
entities such as banks, insurance, builders etc. are against those
subscribers who were not registered as telemarketers and were making
the UCC through their normal 10 digit mobile numbers. Authority has
asked all the major erring banks to submit their action taken report in
respect of complaint. In response, some of the major banks have
submitted thatthere are small dealers/ agents,in their business
model,who do not have much incentive to afford the initial security
deposit of Rs. 1,00,000/- with service providers for working as a
telemarketer. Although, banks assured that they have mandated the
condition of registration as telemarketer with TRAI is compulsory for
becoming the dealers/ agents of bank, however, they also requested to
reduce the registration charges and initial security deposit for becoming
a telemarketer to motivate and provide the opportunity to these small
agents/ dealers to do the business in a legitimate manner.

7. Authority has also observed that one of the primary reason for non
registering as telemarketer by such agents/ agencies is saving in cost of
registration and initial security deposit. Therefore, Authority considered
the request and is of the view that unsolicited commercial
communication may be significantly reduced if majority of these
unregistered callers are registered as telemarketer with TRAI and use the
prescribed telemarketing resources for making the commercial calls/
SMS. Accordingly, to facilitate and to motivate these agencies/ agents to
register themselves with TRAI, the Authority reviewed the registration
period, registration feeand initial security deposit amount through these
regulations.

Highlights on Telecom Subscription Data as on 31st October, 2013 TRAI

 1
For immediate release (Press Release No. 92/2013)
Information Note to the Press


TELECOM REGULATORY AUTHORITY OF INDIA
New Delhi, 13th December, 2013
(www.trai.gov.in)




Highlights on Telecom Subscription Data as on 31st October, 2013


Mobile Number Portability requests increased from 102.49 million
subscribers at the end of September, 2013 to 104.79 million at the end of
October 2013. In the month of October 2013 alone 2.30 million requests
have been made for MNP.
Active wireless subscribers on the date of Peak VLR in October, 2013 are
744.28 million, 85.01% of the total subscribers.
Wireline Broadband (> 512 Kbps) subscription reached 14.91 million in
October 2013.



_______________________________________________________________________________________________
* Based on the population projections from Census data published by the Office of Registrar
General & Census Commissioner of India.
Particulars Wireless Wireline
Total
Wireless +
Wireline
Total Subscribers (Millions) 875.48 29.08 904.56
Total Net Monthly Addition (Millions) 4.90 -0.20 4.70
Monthly Growth (%) 0.56 -0.68 0.52
Urban Subscribers (Millions) 522.21 22.88 545.09
Urban Subscribers Net Monthly Addition (Millions) 2.00 -0.10 1.90
Monthly Growth (%) 0.38 -0.41 0.35
Rural Subscribers (Millions) 353.27 6.21 359.48
Rural Subscribers Net Monthly Addition (Millions) 2.90 -0.10 2.79
Monthly Growth (%) 0.83 -1.65 0.78
Overall Teledensity* 70.96 2.36 73.32
Urban Teledensity* 138.23 6.06 144.28
Rural Teledensity* 41.27 0.73 42.0
Share of Urban Subscribers 59.65% 78.66% 60.26%
Share of Rural Subscribers 40.35% 21.34% 39.74%  2
I. Total Telephone Subscribers

• The number of telephone
subscribers in India increased from
899.86 million at the end of
September, 2013 to 904.56 million at
the end of October 2013, thereby
showing a monthly growth of 0.52%.
The share of urban subscribers has
declined from 60.36% to 60.26%
whereas share of rural subscribers
has increased from 39.64% to
39.74% in the month of October
2013. With this, the overall
Teledensity in India increased from
73.01 at the end of September, 2013
to 73.32 at the end of October, 2013.

• Subscription in the urban areas
increased from 543.18 million in
September, 2013 to 545.09 million at
the end of October, 2013.
Subscription in rural areas increased
from 356.68 million to 359.48 million
during the same period. The monthly
growth rate of urban and rural
subscription is 0.35% and 0.78%
respectively. The overall urban
Teledensity has increased from
144.02 to 144.28 and Rural
Teledensity increased from 41.70 to
42.00 in this month.
  3
Overall Teledensity (Circle Wise)


 Notes:
1. Population data/Projections are available state wise only.
2. Teledensity figures are derived from the subscriber data provided by the operators and
the population projections published by the Office of the Registrar General & Census
Commissioner, India.
3. Delhi Service area, apart from the State of Delhi, includes wireless subscribers of the
areas served by the local exchanges of Ghaziabad & Noida (in UP) and Gurgaon &
Faridabad (in Haryana). West Bengal service area includes Kolkata, Maharashtra
includes Mumbai and Tamil Nadu includes Chennai




  4

II. Wireless Segment (GSM, CDMA & FWP)

• Total wireless subscriber base
increased from 870.58 million in
September, 2013 to 875.48 million at
the end of October 2013, registering a
monthly growth of 0.56%. The share
of urban wireless subscribers has
declined from 59.75% to 59.65%
whereas share of rural wireless
subscribers has increased from
40.25% to 40.35%. The overall
wireless Teledensity in India has
reached to 70.96 from 70.63 of
previous month.



• Wireless subscription in urban
areas increased from 520.21 million
in September, 2013 to 522.21 million
at the end of October, 2013. The
wireless subscription in rural areas
increased from 350.37 million to
353.27 million during the same
period. The urban wireless
Teledensity has increased from
137.93 to 138.23 and rural
Teledensity has increased from 40.96
to 41.27. Detailed statistics is
available at Annexure I.
  5
• Private operators hold 88.41% of the wireless market share (based on
subscriber base) where as BSNL and MTNL, the two PSU operators hold only
11.59% market share. The graphical presentations of market shares and
shares in net additions of all the service providers during the month of
October, 2013 are given below:
A. Service Provider wise Market Share as on 31st October, 2013.




B. Service Provider wise net subscriber addition during October, 2013

  6


III. VLR Data
Out of the total 875.48 million wireless subscribers, 744.28 million were
active on the date of Peak VLR for the month of October 2013. The proportion
of VLR subscribers is approximately 85.01% of the total wireless subscriber
base reported by the service providers.

Service Provider wise, Idea leads the tally with 97.5% followed by Vodafone
(95.7%) and Bharti (95.3%). Circle-wise, West Bengal has the highest
proportion of VLR subscribers with 90.14% followed by Maharashtra(89.98%)
and M.P.(89.12%). TN (incl. Chennai) has the lowest proportion with 74.37%.
The detailed statistics of proportionate VLR is at Annexure II & methodology
used for reporting subscriber base/active subscribers is at Annexure IV.

A. Proportion of VLR subscribers (Service Provider wise) – October, 2013
97.5%
95.7%
95.3%
93.5%
71.9%
67.6%
64.6%
57.9%
56.8%
56.5%
54.5%
52.5%
47.8%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
0
50
100
150
200
250
Idea
Vodafone
Bharti
Reliance
Uninor
Tata
Aircel
Sistema
MTNL
BSNL
Quadrant
Videocon
Loop
VLR %
Subscribers (in Millions)
Proportion of VLR
Total Subs VLR Subs VLR %




  7

C. Proportion of VLR subscribers (Service Area wise)- October, 2013




D. Service Provider wise monthly growth in total wireless subscribers

  8

E. Service Area wise monthly growth in total wireless subscribers




IV. Mobile Number Portability
As per the data reported by the service providers, by the end of October 2013
about 104.79 million subscribers have submitted their requests to different
service providers for porting their mobile number. In MNP Zone-I (Northern &
Western India) maximum number of requests have been received in Rajasthan
(about 10.44 million) followed by Gujarat (about 9.09 million) whereas in MNP
Zone-II (Southern & Eastern) maximum number of requests have been
received in Karnataka (about 12.06 million) followed by Andhra Pradesh
Service area (about 9.52 million). In the month of October 2013, total number
of subscribers who have submitted their request for MNP is 2.30 million. The
status of MNP requests in various service areas is given below:






  9

Service Area Wise MNP Status at the end of October 2013
Zone -1 Zone - 2
Service Area
Number of
Porting
Requests
Service Area
Number of
Porting
Requests
Delhi 3820027 Andhra Pradesh 9522712
Gujarat 9088985 Assam 385539
Himachal Pradesh 372407 Bihar 2376258
Haryana 3893337 Karnataka 12060168
Jammu & Kashmir 18652 Kerala 4175072
Maharashtra 8447272 Kolkata 2292549
Mumbai 4166967 Madhya Pradesh 5986640
Punjab 3550982 North East 178426
Rajasthan 10436347 Orissa 2211738
Uttar Pradesh - East 5995511 Tamil Nadu 6168714
Uttar Pradesh - West 5840547 West Bengal 3800105
 Total 55,631,034 Total 49,157,921
Total (Zone-1 + Zone-2) 104,788,955
Net Addition
22,99,069
(in October 2013)




V. Wireline Segment
Wireline subscriber base declined from 29.28 million at the end of September,
2013 to 29.08 Million at the end of October, 2013. Net reduction in wireline
subscriber base was 0.20 million at the decline rate of 0.68%. The share of
urban subscribers has increased from 78.44% to 78.66% whereas share of
rural subscribers has decreased from 21.56% to 21.34%. The overall wireline
Teledensity has decreased from 2.38 in September, 2013 to 2.36 in October
2013, with urban and rural Teledensity being 6.06 and 0.73 respectively.
BSNL and MTNL, the two PSU operators hold 78.01% of the Wireline market
share. Detailed statistics are at Annexure-III. The graphical presentation of
market share of all service providers as on 31st October, 2013 is given below:

  10

F. Service Provider wise Market Share as on 31st October, 2013





G. Wireline Service Provider wise Net addition/decline during
October, 2013



  11


VI. Category wise Growth

• As can be seen from the following tables, the Circles in Category B show
the highest net addition and highest rate of monthly growth in
subscriber base in wireless segment. In wireline segment, only Metro
Cities show the positive net addition and positive rate of monthly
growth in subscriber base from September, 2013 to October, 2013.

Category wise Net Additions and subscriber base

Category
Net Additions during the
month of October, 2013
Subscriber Base as on
31st October, 2013
Wireline Wireless Wireline Wireless
Circle A -113459 1555257 11485477 313833239
Circle B -73765 2405540 8845302 346921784
Circle C -22668 618133 1515246 122558338
Metro 10399 319442 7236880 92167017
All India -199,493 4,898,372 29,082,905 875,480,378


Category-wise Growth Rate in Access Service

Category
Monthly Rate of Growth
(Sep-2013 to Oct-2013)
Yearly rate of growth
(Oct-2012 to Oct-2013)
Wireline Wireless Wireline Wireless
Circle A -0.98% 0.50% -6.12% -2.84%
Circle B -0.83% 0.70% -9.39% -3.04%
Circle C -1.47% 0.51% -18.86% -1.74%
Metro 0.14% 0.35% 2.16% -6.61%
All India -0.68% 0.56% -6.03% -3.18%
• Metros indicate data for Delhi, Mumbai & Kolkata. Data for Chennai service area has
been included in Circle A, as part of TN

  12
VII. Wireline Broadband (≥ 512 Kbps download)

• The Department of Telecommunications issued a Notification on 18th July,
2013 revising the definition of Broadband as ‘Broadband is a data
connection that is able to support interactive services including Internet
access and has the capability of the minimum download speed of 512 Kbps
to an individual subscriber from the point of presence (PoP) of the service
provider intending to provide broadband service’. Accordingly, the
minimum download speed has been increased from 256 Kbps to 512 Kbps.

• From this month, the service providers have started reporting number of
wireline broadband subscribers in accordance with the revised definition
i.e. >= 512 Kbps.

• As on 31st October, 2013, there are 153 Service Providers (ISPs) which are
providing wireline broadband services in the country. Out of these, 105
SPs (which constitute 98.71% of the market share) have submitted
broadband subscription data for the month of October 2013 as per revised
definition of broadband. For the rest of the ISPs, data from previous month
(with pre-revised definition) has been retained.

• At the end of October 2013, there were 14.91 Million Wireline Broadband
subscribers in the country. However, it may be seent that increase in the
minimum download speed from 256 Kbps to 512 Kbps has not hugely
impacted the overall number of wireline broadband subscribers.

• Top five ISPs in terms of market share (based on subscriber base) are:
BSNL (9.96 million), Bharti Airtel (1.32 million), MTNL (1.11 million),
Hathway Cable (0.37 million) and Beam Telecom (0.34 million).


  13

H. Wireline Broadband Market Share




Contact details in case of any clarification:
Manish Sinha, Advisor (F&EA), TRAI
Mahanagar Doorsanchar Bhawan
Jawahar Lal Nehru Marg, Authorised to issue:
New Delhi – 110002,
Ph: 011-23221509
Fax: 011-23236650 (Manish Sinha)
E-mail: manishsinha@trai.gov.in Advisor (F&EA)



Note: Information in this Press Release is based on the data provided by the Service Providers. 14
Annexure-I
Sep-13 Oct-13 Sep-13 Oct-13 Sep-13 Oct-13 Sep-13 Oct-13 Sep
-13 Oct-13 Sep-13 Oct-13 Sep-13 Oct-13
Andhra Pradesh 18902208 19115573 5838085 5852580 5863892
5912108 6422349 6450442 11981302 12095058 1858428 1886892
9436663 9501007
Assam 4196065 4251030 2596140 2597978 2556126 2577140 0 0 47
6682 497292 3588972 3624514 1249026 1253565
Bihar 20518049 20770611 8818475 8852878 6747640 6803842 32
72417 3196125 6164066 6283709 4677210 4520428 3724996 3708
092
Delhi 9725980 9763888 7786352 7817210 8845576 8907290 2869
124 2849936 5251411 5263586 3133898 3158515 0
Gujarat 7117258 7162891 6697392 6757186 16518850 16698123
2628198 2669215 8690983 8770740 35773 35773 4327505 4343242
Haryana 2337348 2327703 2132062 2139625 4681275 4717992 26
41822 2651913 3882250 3951599 11092 11092 3084055 3131488
Himachal Pradesh 2090603 2097720 1465806 1491489 534203 5
30706 149456 143882 513452 513097 742881 760827 1535145 153
2615
J & K 2532977 2559401 672626 679719 687681 702697 0 0 267487
277245 2014339 2035827 1232401 1238330
Karnataka 16564821 16682484 6280514 6237140 6920902 69686
35 5847645 5909189 6586224 6606648 2201043 2255143 7101531
7098302
Kerala 3599838 3606386 2331344 2219425 6489482 6530984 165
4458 1669408 8466741 8546006 4883 4883 8016967 8062880
Kolkata 3751235 3776951 3962970 3827972 4365823 4403050 28
74101 2842011 1316958 1304196 2179944 2275412 2281729 2271
275
Madhya Pradesh 10209163 10262064 12477822 12546528 42565
79 4337020 3929565 3957766 16295647 16429076 22694 22694 51
49579 5218831
Maharashtra 10226355 10255952 7189914 7204064 14076683 14
177690 6074114 6085361 17421267 17625254 1312246 1327860 6
612452 6607228
Mumbai 4107494 4156114 5925983 6046347 6831544 6890504 342
0790 3437517 3237854 3277902 1704239 1720873 0
North East 2852276 2903739 992057 1009333 1045692 1050717
0 0 328482 328159 2352414 2348938 1808999 1737590
Orissa 7289389 7337009 4134554 4161687 3168882 3183424 204
3209 2023659 1063004 1059298 2908410 2968631 4529030 45129
97
Punjab 7107014 7144990 3070724 2983580 4503245 4513443 244
9104 2446167 5845234 5858165 1002025 1015633 4496007 44881
81
Rajasthan 14836741 14974122 5897406 5942076 9270335 93502
51 2423876 2344515 5660460 5677941 3566660 3627418 5891417
5927691
Tamil Nadu
(incl. Chennai)
13929539 13961929 6264558 6202318 12665721 12688516 53037
25 5340360 2486098 2484276 21968800 22120688 9605448 95699
39
U.P.(E) 15433113 15530744 8536047 8623968 14400071 144680
44 4272276 4242016 7594778 7681362 4767195 4779958 1020491
2 10222937
U.P.(W) 6484305 6507159 5927904 6030529 9261589 9275287 37
48747 3757992 11014960 11125771 109150 109150 4605390 4519
594
West Bengal 9575630 9727326 7263266 7488377 11851390 1200
7030 1521962 1432904 2682852 2721273 3082883 3131142 29649
29 2951690
Total 193387401 194875786 116262001 116712009 155543181 1
56694493 63546938 63450378 127228192 128377653 63245179 6
3742291 97858181 97897474
Net Addition 1488385 450008 1151312 -96560 1149461 497112
39293
Circle
Page 1 of 2
Bharti Reliance Vodafone Tata Idea
Group
Aircel BSNL
Wireless Subscriber Base
  15
Page 2 of 2
Sep-13 Oct-13 Sep-13 Oct-13 Sep-13 Oct-13 Sep-13 Oct-13 Sep
-13 Oct-13 Sep-13 Oct-13 Sep-13 Oct-13 Net Add.
Andhra Pradesh 0 0 4414731 4128248 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 64717658 64941
908 224250
Assam 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14663011 14801519 138508
Bihar 0 0 4398886 4432398 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 58321739 58568083 246344
Delhi 2556692 2554535 0 0 882224 891402 0 0 0 0 0 0 41051257 4120
6362 155105
Gujarat 0 0 4960851 5057184 175572 174171 0 0 988327 1065873 0
0 52140709 52734398 593689
Haryana 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1131142 1197934 0 0 19901046 20129346 228300
Himachal Pradesh 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7031546 7070336 38790
J & K 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7407511 7493219 85708
Karnataka 0 0 0 1924172 1916535 0 0 0 0 0 0 53426852 53674076 247
224
Kerala 0 0 0 436353 438123 0 0 0 0 0 0 31000066 31078095 78029
Kolkata 0 0 0 764521 760141 0 0 0 0 0 0 21497281 21461008 -36273
Madhya Pradesh 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1125094 1220740 0 0 53466143 539947
19 528576
Maharashtra 0 0 5770597 5745699 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 68683628 69029108
345480
Mumbai 1184414 1020969 0 0 0 2886719 2949421 0 0 0 0 29299037 29
499647 200610
North East 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9379920 9378476 -1444
Orissa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25136478 25246705 110227
Punjab 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1725835 1815022 30199188 30265181 65993
Rajasthan 0 0 0 2178127 2207729 0 0 0 0 0 0 49725022 50051743 326
721
Tamil Nadu
(incl. Chennai)
0 0 0 1085246 1085723 0 0 0 0 0 0 73309135 73453749 144614
U.P.(E) 0 0 7541316 7689609 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 72749708 73238638 488930
U.P.(W) 0 0 5269519 5280827 318743 307313 0 0 0 0 0 0 46740307 46
913622 173315
West Bengal 0 0 0 1791852 1790698 0 0 0 0 0 0 40734764 41250440 5
15676
Total 3741106 3575504 32355900 32333965 9556810 9571835 28
86719 2949421 3244563 3484547 1725835 1815022 870582006 87
5480378 4898372
Net Addition -165602 -21935 15025 62702 239984 89187 48983
72
Annexure-I
MTNL Unitech Sistema Loop
Videocon
Quadrant (HFCL)
Total
Group
Wireless Subscriber Base
Circle
  16

Circle Aircel Bharti BSNL
Quadrant
(HFCL)
Idea Loop MTNL Reliance Sistema Tata Unitech Videocon Vodaf
one Total
Andhra Pradesh
53.50 97.15 68.53 96.18 96.13 72.08 66.70 90.41
86.38
Assam
85.41 97.59 70.79 88.37 82.06
95.70
88.98
Bihar
68.16 95.83 52.32 98.01 96.58 46.70 76.52 97.04
87.28
Delhi
66.20 82.94 98.50 46.37 96.08 47.07 66.00 96.88
84.93
Gujarat
51.58 94.49 61.48 97.43 96.72 46.14 65.98 65.71 46.84 92.91
86.69
Haryana
8.00 98.62 51.52 96.06 96.58 66.08 54.17 96.06
82.99
Himachal Pradesh
53.27 95.54 73.29 101.98 89.06 62.15 100.27
84.95
J & K
84.29 96.05 69.57 84.51 55.52
87.63
83.59
Karnataka
55.31 98.40 55.07 96.50 94.33 58.62 77.67 91.93
85.61
Kerala
31.60 96.56 65.44 97.90 94.36 58.02 75.23 92.06
86.06
Kolkata
76.27 95.22 33.89 95.55 96.85 57.46 80.47 97.60
84.23
Madhya Pradesh
8.68 98.13 55.98 102.47 86.94 71.07 55.90 89.63
89.12
Maharashtra
56.53 95.53 71.22 98.62 96.78 77.66 69.36 97.31
89.98
Mumbai
59.98 92.78 89.00 47.83 82.96 96.15 69.55 92.49
83.53
North East
73.58 97.73 55.07 84.29 74.67
89.74
79.93
Orissa
67.68 95.15 59.70 84.81 81.50 72.83 88.25
80.24
Punjab
42.49 94.16 53.79 54.47 95.87 96.72 64.10 97.64
82.73
Rajasthan
74.48 94.60 46.40 100.11 96.83 51.74 69.28 97.34
85.76
Tamil Nadu
(incl.
Chennai)
57.27 96.85 48.23 80.57 92.48 63.16 61.95 95.27
74.37
U.P. (E)
66.32 94.32 44.75 99.25 95.05 57.87 74.08 99.29
82.92
U.P. (W)
26.79 90.23 51.89 96.93 96.31 46.74 58.04 77.41 97.62
85.91
West Bengal
71.34 97.22 59.42 97.47 94.63 70.30 40.37 101.28
90.14
Total
64.57 95.28 56.48 54.47 97.50 47.83 56.82 93.49 57.93 67.58 7
1.87 52.53 95.69 85.01
Proportion of VLR on the date of Peak VLR in the mo
nth of Oct, 2013 (%) Annexure-II
  17
Annexure-III
.
Sep-13 Oct-13 Sep-13 Oct-13 Sep-13 Oct-13 Sep-13 Oct-13 Sep
-13 Oct-13 Sep-13 Oct-13 Sep-13 Oct-13 Sep-13 Oct-13 Sep-13
Oct-13 Net Add.
Andhra Pradesh 1751010 1697562 125802 126417 88593 88369 1
65416 166921
5,940
5,970 2136761 2085239
-51522
Assam 191564 186361
0 0
840
870 192404 187231
-5173
Bihar 372808 364000
5592 5685 10692 10650
270
270 389362 380605
-8757
Delhi
1598794 1600634 1162863 1186987 183570 183743 93159 93471
14,490
15,000 3052876 3079835
26959
Gujarat 1496328 1489213 55994 56283 96795 96426 72875 72679
630
660 1722622 1715261
-7361
Haryana 470,023 468,335 20742 16139 5440 5527 26489 26836
522694 516837
-5857
Himachal Pradesh 256,824 255,182
4733 4733 2446 2477
264003 262392
-1611
J & K 189,774 189,627
0 0 0 0
189774 189627
-147
Karnataka 1613635 1585179 487776 491754 115937 116588 1494
72 151013
4,260
4,380 2371080 2348914
-22166
Kerala 2871487 2842910 49218 49617 52885 52584 11420 11530
2985010 2956641
-28369
Kolkata 886504 865363 106901 107414 81377 81475 37917 38086
1320
1320 1114019 1093658
-20361
Madhya Pradesh 830208 827509 231995 225987 25563 25334 171
00 17234
120
150 1104986 1096214
-8772
Maharashtra 1942678 1932974 68774 69411 99408 99015 247964
249007
3,210
3,270 2362034 2353677
-8357
Mumbai
1944053 1942759 350592 356008 233286 233713 523465 522477
8,190
8,430 3059586 3063387
3801
North East
143,447 142,588
0 0
60 143447 142648
-799
Orissa 348150 341842
3676 3715 6738 6826
360
360 358924 352743
-6181
Punjab 935140 932937 97111 92978 24577 24269 17087 16990 202
402 204884 270
360 1276587 1272418
-4169
Rajasthan 852978 850196 36466 36786 24193 24000 7935 8194
54351 54404
510
510 976433 974090
-2343
Tamil Nadu
(incl. Chennai)
2310589 2292771 471287 463714 147040 147198 74523 75553
3000
3150 3006439 2982386
-24053
U.P.(E) 766715 754600 51230 51750 40525 40637 14000 14010
540
540 873010 861537
-11473
U.P.(W) 616600 608606 21128 21187 5998 6008 8464 8437
270
270 652460 644508
-7952
West Bengal 521979 517097
2153 2168 3755 3792
527887 523057
-4830
Total 19368441 19144852 3542847 3543393 3337879 3352432 12
41341 1241187 1490917 1496183 202402 204884 54351 54404
44220
45570 29282398 29082905 -199493
Net Addition -223589 546 14553 -154 5266 2482 53 1350 -199493
Wireline Subscriber Base
Circle
Reliance Tata Quadrant (HFCL) Vodafone
Total
Group
BSNL MTNL Bharti
Sistema

  18
Annexure IV
VLR Subscribers in the Wireless Segment

Home Location Register (HLR) is a central database that contains details of
each mobile phone subscriber that is authorized to use the GSM core network.
The HLRs store details of every SIM card issued by the mobile phone operator.
Each SIM has a unique identifier called an International Mobile Subscriber
Identity (IMSI), which is the primary key to each HLR record. The HLR data is
stored for as long as a subscriber remains with the mobile phone operator.
HLR also manages the mobility of subscribers by means of updating their
position in administrative areas. It sends the subscriber data to a Visitor
Location Register (VLR).

Subscriber numbers reported by the service providers is the difference
between the numbers of IMSI registered in service provider’s Home Location
Register(HLR) and sum of other figures as given below:-

1 Total IMSI's in HLR (A)
2 Less: (B=a + b + c + d + e)
a. Test/Service Cards
b. Employees
c.
Stock in hand/in
Distributional Cannels
(Active Card)
d.
Subscriber Retention
period expired
e.
Service suspended pending
disconnection
3 Subscribers Base (A-B)


  19
Visitor Location Register (VLR) is a temporary database of the subscribers
who have roamed into the particular area, which it serves. Each base station
in the network is served by exactly one VLR; hence a subscriber cannot be
present in more than one VLR at a time.

If subscriber is in active stage i.e. he is able to send/receive calls/SMSs he is
available both in HLR and VLR. However, it may be possible that the
subscriber is registered in HLR but not in VLR due to the reason that he is
either switched-off or moved out of coverage area, not reachable etc. In such
circumstances he will be available in HLR but not in VLR. This causes
difference between subscriber number reported by the service providers and
numbers available in VLR.

The VLR data calculated here is on the basis of active subscribers in VLR on
the date of Peak VLR of the particular month for which the data is being
collected. This data is to be taken from the switches having the purge time of
not more than 72 hours.

---------
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